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Abstract
This paper introduces the notion of experiences, which
help situate agents in their environment, providing a
concrete link on how the continually evolving environ-
ment impacts the evolution of an agent’s BDI model.
Then, using the notion of shared experience as a prim-
itive construct, we develop a novel formal model of
shared intention which we believe more adequately de-
scribes and motivates social behaviour than traditional
BDI logics that focus on modelling individual agents.
Whilst many philosophers have strongly argued that
collective intentionality cannot always be equated to the
collection of the individual agents, there has been no AI
model that has proposed how this could occur. To the
best of our knowledge this is the ﬁrst attempt to develop
the notion of shared experience from an AI perspective
that cannot be reduced to descriptions of a single agent.
Introduction
Existing models of BDI agents typically assume the agent
has its belief base already built (d’Inverno et al., 2004; Bor-
dini, Hu¨bner, and Wooldridge, 2007; Winikoff, 2005). The
abstract logics describing BDI systems do not consider how
an agent’s ongoing activity in an environment builds these
elements and, moreover, how that activity impacts on the re-
lationships between them. In this work, we provide an agent
model that takes into consideration how the environment and
activities in the environment helps shape the belief base of
an agent situated in that environment. This includes perceiv-
ing environments that results in agents having new experi-
ences, which in turn affects the perceiving agent’s beliefs,
desires, and intentions, which then leads to new actions, and
back round again to new experiences.
After presenting the basic agent model, we introduce
a logical formalism (X-BDI) to describe agent reasoning
whose semantics are grounded in the model. In this formal-
ism we deﬁne the notion of shared experience based upon
the notion of individual experience, and use it to address
the issue of collective intentionality. We believe shared ex-
periences and shared intentions provide the basis of social
behaviour which is the foundation of multiagent system re-
search. Our model provides an adequate description of why
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agents would approach others to interact with in the ﬁrst
place outside the concept of a shared plan.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: we
start with a speciﬁcation of the agent model (which provides
the grounding for the logic’s computational semantics), then
we introduce the logic for the experience based BDI model
(X-BDI), and follow it with an example that illustrates the
impact of this work. We end with a brief literature review
and some concluding remarks.
The Agent Model
We argue that the physical world is populated with objects
(some of which may be labelled as agents) and changed
through events (where some subset may be labelled as ac-
tions performed by agents). Here, our focus is not on the
physical world itself, but on how it is perceived by agents. It
is the perception of the agent situated in a given environment
that affects the agent’s beliefs, desires, and intentions. More
precisely, we introduce the notion of experience, which is
the result of the agent perceiving its environment and form-
ing some conceptions about it. We argue that experiences
shape beliefs (usually resulting in belief updates), beliefs in-
ﬂuence desires, and desires drive intentions. Intentions in
turn lead the agent to act in its environment (where the action
could be as simple as to observe), which results in the agent
having new experiences. In other words, we say that the ex-
perience is the missing link that completes the BDI cycle by
situating the agent in its environment and illustrating how
the environment impacts the evolution of an agent’s BDI.
This section provides the basic deﬁnitions of experiences,
beliefs, desires, and intentions. We note that our proposal is
based on the assumption that an agent can perceive its envi-
ronment, resulting in having a set of percepts. Although we
note that percepts may sometimes be imagined (following
the cognitive neuroscience view that considers imagination
as a second order perception (Schu¨tz-Bosbach and Prinz,
2007; Perrett et al., 2009; Weiler, Suchan, and Daum, 2010;
Szpunar, Watson, and McDermott, 2007)). As such, the set
of agent a’s percepts is referred to as Pa = Ra ∪ Ia, where
percepts are either real (R) or imagined (I). We also note
that percepts, both real and imagined, could described vari-
ous types of elements, amongst these are percepts of agents
(AG) and percepts of actions (AC).
Experiences
An experience is deﬁned by a number of percepts that the
agent decides to group together and label as a single entity.
Experiences may be basic (composed of percepts) or com-
pound (composed of a combination of percepts and other
experiences). An example of the former would be the sunset
one witnessed in Phuket. An example of the latter would be
going out last night, which contains nested experiences such
as having a drink, seeing a show, and having dinner.
We adopt Kant’s argument (Kitcher, 1990) that the ba-
sic cognitive hard wired relationships are time ordering (≺),
causality (), and spatial () relationships. We also adopt
Kant’s view (Kant, 1838) that human beings follow the cate-
gorical imperative method that makes them classify things as
good or bad. As such, we introduce the evaluation function
(♥) for evaluating experiences. We note that one may also
think of evaluations to be used to describe one’s emotions
towards an experience. For instance, “I loved that game”.
We state that the set of all experiences of agent a is Ea. A
single experience of agent a, Ea ∈ Ea, is then deﬁned as the
tuple:
Ea = 〈L, E ′a ∪ P ′a,≺,, ,♥〉
• L describes the experience’s unique label that identiﬁes it.
• E ′a ∪ P ′a describes its content (referenced as content(Ea)),
which may be composed of percepts (P ′a ⊆ Pa), sub ex-
periences (E ′a ⊆ Ea), or a combination of both.
• ≺⊆ (E ′a∪P ′a)× (E ′a∪P ′a) deﬁnes a partial temporal order
over the sub-experiences and perceptions.
• ⊆ (E ′a ∪ P ′a) × (E ′a ∪ P ′a) deﬁnes a causal relationship
over the sub-experiences and perceptions, and it should
satisfy the property⊆≺.
• ⊆ (E ′a ∪ P ′a) × (E ′a ∪ P ′a) × S deﬁnes a spa-
cial relationship between the sub-experiences and
perceptions, and it should satisfy the property
(a, b, s) ∈⇒ (a, b) 
∈≺ ∧(b, a) 
∈≺. An ex-
ample of the set of spacial relationships could be
S = {above, below, left, right, behind, infront}.
• ♥ : L → V deﬁnes the experience’s evaluation, which
maps a label to an evaluation space. An example of an
evaluation space is V = {positive, negative}. The la-
bel is intended to represent the evaluation criteria, such
as L = {impact, usefulness, contentment, surprise}. The
evaluation criteria may either represent rational criteria,
such as whether “the experience helps one achieve their
goals”, or emotional ones. One may think of numerous
emotional criteria, but the six basic emotions according
to Paul Ekman (Ekman, 1972) are: anger, disgust, fear,
surprise, sadness, and happiness.
We distinguish a special type of experience, a basic ex-
perience Ea, in which all the contents of the experience are
single percepts: Ea = 〈L,P ′a,≺,, ,♥〉. Agent a’s set of
all basic experiences is referred to as Ea.
Another interesting type of basic experience is the basic
action, which we deﬁne as a basic experience, whose con-
tent contains only the percepts describing the pre-conditions
of the action, the action percept describing the action itself
(AC ∈ AC), and the percepts describing the post-conditions
of the action. The temporal relation then states that all pre-
condition percepts should precede the action percept and
that the action percept should precede all the post-condition
percepts. Additionally, the causal relation states that the ac-
tion percept leads to the post-condition percepts. A basic
action is then deﬁned as a basic experience Ea that satiﬁes
the following properties:
∀ x ∈ content(Ea) · (∃ y ∈ content(Ea) · x ≺ y ∨ y ≺ x)
x ≺ y ∧ y ≺ z ⇒ y ∈ ACa
| ACa ∩ content(Ea) |= 1
x y ⇒ x ∈ ACa ∧ y 
∈ ACa
x y ⇒ x ≺ y
Beliefs
An agent holds beliefs about itself, its environment, its feel-
ings (if any), and so on. There are different types of be-
liefs, such as: factual beliefs which are beliefs based on the
agent’s percepts (for example, I saw the book on the shelf
and I therefore believe it is on the shelf, or I saw the water
on the road on a hot summer’s day but I believe this was
a mirage as there was no water about); and generic beliefs
which represent generic rules that the agent believes in (for
example, “all men are mortal”, or “there exists birds that do
not ﬂy”). However, we do not dwell on the differences be-
tween these here, and we simply state that an agent has a set
of beliefs: B.
Desires
Desires are essentially experiences that one desires to take
part in. In other words, the percepts composing these expe-
riences are imagined ones, as they have not yet happened or
may never happen. For example, one can desire to win the
Nobel prize. A desire is then a basic experience E such that
content(E) ⊂ I, where I describes the set of imagined per-
cepts. We note that desires may or may not be feasible. Fur-
thermore, agents may or may not commit to realising their
desires; they usually attempt to realise a subset of their de-
sires. Desires that the agent commits to realising through a
concrete plan are called intentions, which we introduce next.
Intentions
Intentions are desires with plans: Intention = Desire×Plan,
where a plan is deﬁned as a partial order of imagined basic
experiences: Plan ⊆ E × E . We note that basic experiences
include basic actions, and an imagined basic action is essen-
tially an action that the agent has committed to realise but
has not realised yet. When performing actions, the imag-
ined action will eventually be observed and recorded as an
experience with real percepts, as opposed to imagined ones.
Agent Model
An agent is a compilation of its own percepts, experiences,
beliefs, desires, and intentions; its capabilities to manifest
these formulae; and its capability to perform other actions
(such as making commitments, sending messages, and so
on). As such, an agent model is then deﬁned as the tuple:
〈P, E ,B,D, I,E,B,D, I,C, 〉
where P is the agent’s set of all percepts, E its set of expe-
riences and E its capability (deﬁned as a function) of mani-
festing experiences, B its set of beliefs and B its capability
of manifesting beliefs, D its set of desires and D its capa-
bility of manifesting desires, I its set of intentions and I its
capability of manifesting intentions, and ﬁnally, C its capa-
bility of performing other actions.
Not all agents will have all these capabilities, and typi-
cally they will have a subset of these, and some with differ-
ent degrees. As such, one may deﬁne different categories
of agents based on their different capabilities: the degree of
capability based (based on C), of intentionality (based on E,
B, D, and I), and so on. Our research focuses on the inten-
tional agent.
Experience-Based BDI logic
We now deﬁne a BDI logic that is grounded on the notion
of experience which we will call X-BDI. We ﬁrst deﬁne its
syntax, then we give its semantics based on the formal deﬁ-
nitions of the previous section, and ﬁnally present a sample
of the logic’s inference rules.
Syntax
• If ϕ is a propositional well formed formula then ϕ ∈
X-BDI
• If ϕ is a propositional well formed formula, α ∈ A is an
agent, and P is a set of plans, then Action(α,ϕ) ∈ P
• If ϕ ∈ X-BDI, α ∈ A is an agent, and p ∈ 2P is a plan
then E(α,ϕ), B(α,ϕ), D(α,ϕ), I(α,ϕ, p) ∈ X-BDI
• If ϕ ∈ X-BDI, G = {α, β, . . . } ⊆ A, and p ∈ 2P then
CE(G, ϕ), JE(G, ϕ), SE(G, ϕ, p),
CD(G, ϕ), JD(G, ϕ), SD(G, ϕ, p),
CI(G, ϕ, p), JI(G, ϕ, p), SI(G, ϕ, p) ∈ X-BDI
• if ϕ and ψ ∈ X-BDI then ¬ϕ, ϕ ∨ ψ ∈ X-BDI
The meaning of the symbols are as follows: B, D, and I
are the classical BDI symbols, and E stands for Experience.
We use the letter C as a preﬁx to the E, B, D, and I symbols
to mean Common; J to mean Joint; and S to mean Shared.
Action has the obvious meaning. Thus, the expression:
SI({α, β}, seeBCNplay, {Action(α, tv),Action(β, stadium)})
is a literal in X-BDI expressing that α and β have the shared
intention to see Barcelona play a football match by α plan-
ning to see the match on tv and β going to the stadium.
Semantics
Formally, we understand the model of the world (which is
populated by agents) as a Kripke structure where the state
of the world and the mind state of agents evolve due to the
actions of agents. For instance, if ϕ is perceived by α (and
it beomes part of α’s experiences), then α may decide to
belief ϕ and we can say that the formula B(α,ϕ) is gen-
erated. Similarly, we can deﬁne the semantics of formulae
like D(α,ϕ). We say agents may have beliefs about other
agents, more concretely about the desires, goals, and beliefs
of other agents. This means that we will give semantics to
nested expressions. For instance, α may have seen an agent
β in the environment watching a football match and jumping
with joy when Barcelona scores a goal and thus α processes
that experience as β’s desire that Barcelona wins, and that
can be represented in the logic as B(α,D(β,winBCN)).
Thus, given a set of agents {α, β, . . . } we deﬁne an X-
BDI semantic model as a pair ω = 〈W,A〉 where W is a
classical logic model (i.e. interpretations for propositions)
and A is a vector of agent models A = 〈α, β, . . . 〉.
Propositions: The interpretation of classical formulae is
straightforward. We will use the symbol |=PL to refer to
classical satisfaction.
〈W,A〉 |= ϕ iff ϕ ∈ PL and W |=PL ϕ
Actions: Differently from other approaches, actions have
a collective interpretation in our logic, if one agent in the
community has a percept of the action being carried on and
the world is consistent with the changes in the environment
caused by the action then the action is true (recall that ACα
is α’s set of perceived actions). The satisfaction of a plan
consists of the satisfaction of each individual action in the
plan.
〈W,A〉 |= Action(α, ϕ) iff ∃β ∈ A · (α, ϕ) ∈ ACβ
and 〈W,A〉 |= ϕ
〈W,A〉 |= p iff p ∈ 2P and ∀ a ∈ p · 〈W,A〉 |= a
Experiences: A model satisﬁes that α had an experience ϕ
if it exists in its repository of experiences Eα. A group of
agents had a common experience tagged as λ if all had an
experience that semantically entails λ. Similarly, a group of
agents had a joint experience tagged as λ if all had an ex-
perience that semantically entails λ and they recognise each
other as part of the experience. Finally, a group of agents had
a shared experience tagged as λ if it was a joint experience
and furthermore they all actively participated in it.1
〈W,A〉 |= E(α, ϕ) iff ϕ ∈ Eα
〈W,A〉 |= CE(G, λ) iff
∀α ∈ G · ∃ϕ ∈ X-BDI
〈W,A〉 |= E(α, ϕ) ∧ ϕ → λ
〈W,A〉 |= JE(G, λ) iff
∀α, β ∈ G · ∃ϕ ∈ X-BDI ·
〈W,A〉 |= E(α, ϕ) ∧ ϕ → λ ∧ B(β,E(α, ϕ))
〈W,A〉 |= SE(G, λ, p) iff
〈W,A〉 |= JE(G, λ) and 〈W,A〉 |= p and
∀α ∈ G · ∃Action(α, ϕ) ∈ p · 〈W,A〉 |= ϕ → λ
Beliefs: The semantics for beliefs is similar to experiences.
However, the notion of shared belief is deﬁned to exist when
the agents in the group recognise one another in a shared
experience that led all of them to hold the belief.
〈W,A〉 |= B(α, ϕ) iff ϕ ∈ Bα
〈W,A〉 |= CB(G, ϕ) iff
1We simplify matters by abusing notation and writing a ∈ p to
mean that action a is ‘part’ of plan p and p′ ⊂ p to mean that plan
p′ is ‘part’ of plan p.
∀α ∈ G · 〈W,A〉 |= B(α, ϕ)
〈W,A〉 |= JB(G, ϕ) iff
∀α, β ∈ G · 〈W,A〉 |= B(α, ϕ) ∧ B(β,B(α, ϕ))
〈W,A〉 |= SB(G, ϕ, p) iff
〈W,A〉 |= JB(G, ϕ) and
∃λ ∈ X-BDI · 〈W,A〉 |= SE(G, λ, p) ∧ λ → ϕ
The same approach used for beliefs can be followed for
Desires, which we skip due to lack of space. Next we give
semantics for intentions.
Intentions: The intention of an agent to reach a goal by
following a plan is true if it is internalised in the intentions
of the agents. Common intentions and joint intentions fol-
low the same patterns as in the case of beliefs. However,
a shared intention requires that each agent actually intends
part of the plan to achieve the goal. That is, no shared inten-
tion can happen if any agent is passive in the achievement of
the goal.
〈W,A〉 |= I(α, ϕ, p) iff (ϕ, p) ∈ Iα
〈W,A〉 |= CI(G, ϕ, p) iff
∀α ∈ G · 〈W,A〉 |= I(α, ϕ, p)
〈W,A〉 |= JI(G, ϕ, p) iff
∀α, β ∈ G · 〈W,A〉 |= I(α, ϕ, p) ∧ B(β, I(α, ϕ, p))
〈W,A〉 |= SI(G, ϕ, p) iff
∀α, β ∈ G · ∃ pα ⊂ p · pα = ∅ ∧
〈W,A〉 |= I(α, ϕ, pα) ∧ B(β, I(α, ϕ, pα))
Inference
We assume classical propositional deduction for proposi-
tional fragments of X-BDI and modus ponens on the X-BDI
formulae. X-BDI axioms are those of propositional logic
plus speciﬁc axioms for X-BDI expressions. Due to space
limitations, here we include axioms for Desires only:
 D(α, ϕ) ∧ D(β, ϕ) ↔ CD({α, β}, ϕ) (1)
 CD(G, ϕ) ∧ D(β, ϕ) ↔ CD(G ∪ {β}, ϕ) (2)
 JD(G, ϕ) → CD(G, ϕ) (3)
 CD({α, β}, ϕ) ∧ B(α,D(β, ϕ)) ∧
B(β,D(α, ϕ)) ↔ JD({α, β}, ϕ) (4)
 JD(G ∪ G′, ϕ) → JD(G, ϕ) ∧ JD(G′, ϕ) (5)
 SD(G, ϕ, p) → JD(G, ϕ, p) (6)
 JD(G, ϕ, p) ∧ SE(G, λ, p) ∧ (λ → ϕ) →
SD(G, ϕ, p) (7)
Example
With the basic deﬁnitions we can now specify the exact steps
needed for intentional agents to achieve shared intentions
(and hence, shared experiences).
Investigating & Realising a joint desire. Agents may
have different motives for engaging in shared experiences,
based on their own personal beliefs and desires. However,
when one agent realises that it would like to fulﬁl its desire
of having a shared experience with other agents, then it will
contact those agents in the hope that it can convince them to
share its desire, and eventually fulﬁl that desire. In multia-
gent systems, this could be achieved through argumentation.
This step describes the agent’s investigation of whether a
joint desire for achieving the shared experience may be re-
alised. If agents agree that they are all interested in realising
a shared experience, then a joint desire to achieve the shared
experience is born (i.e. it becomes true).
Investigating & Realising a shared intention. After a
joint desire is born, agents are then committed to ﬁnding the
plan of action for fulﬁlling the desired shared experience.
Argumentation is usually used here to make sure that all par-
ties agree to who does what and under what conditions. If
the agents succeed in agreeing on a plan of action, then the
shared intention for executing the plan for achieving the de-
sired shared experience is now born (i.e. it becomes true).
Realising a shared experience. Agents are now commit-
ted to carrying out the actions of the plan that they are re-
sponsible for. When the plan has been executed, the shared
experience is realised.
In what follows, we take the scenario of two agents that
are interested in the shared experience of buying a gift to-
gether. Let us say the agents adopt the names of their human
owners, c for Carla and b Bill, and they are interested in
buying a gift for Mary together (the desire to buy a gift for
Mary is referred to as g). In what follows, we describe what
actions could the agents perform based on their X-BDI, and
the resulting change in their X-BDI for each action of the
environment.
0. Motivating the interest in a shared experience. Say
Carla is interested in buying Mary a gift, but because she
cannot afford a gift on her own, she desires to buy the gift
with someone else (referred to as anyone). As such, her
belief base includes:
D(c, SE({c, anyone}, g, inanyway)) (i)
Note that inanyway refers to some plan of action that has
not been decided upon yet.
Bill, on the other hand, desires to share any experience
with Carla (referred to as anything), either because he is
dependent on her, or possibly secretly in love with her. As
such, Bill’s belief base contains the following:
D(b, SE({c, b}, anything, inanyway)) (ii)
1. Investigating & Realising a joint desire. Carla’s desire
to ﬁnd a partner for buying Mary a gift with (literal (i) in
Carla’s belief base) drives her to contact Mary’s friends
hoping to ﬁnd a match, asking each “Would you like to
buy a gift for Mary with me?” Moreover, Bill’s desire to
share an experience with Carla (literal (ii) in Bill’s belief
base) drives him to reply with a “Yes”. This exchange of
information leads to Carla modifying her belief base to
contain the following:
B(c,D(b, SE({c, b}, g, inanyway))) (iii)
B(c,B(b,D(c, SE({c, b}, g, inanyway))))
And deducing that:
B(c, JD({c, b}, SE({c, b}, g, inanyway)))
Similarly, Bill modiﬁes his belief base by adding:
B(b,D(c, SE({c, b}, g, inanyway))) (iv)
B(b,B(c,D(b, SE({c, b}, g, inanyway))))
And deducing that:
B(b, JD({c, b}, SE({c, b}, g, inanyway)))
As such, the following now holds:
JD({c, b}, SE({c, b}, g, inanyway)) (v)
Note that the joint desire for a shared experience may
be the result of various individual desires. For instance,
Carla just needs someone to share her expenses, whereas
Bill just want to do anything with Carla.
Also note that (v) is deduced from axiom (4),
the belief literals (iii) and (iv), and formula
CD({c, b}, SE({c, b}, g, inanyway)), which in turn
is deduced from axiom (1) and belief literals (i) and (ii).
All the deduced formulae that we mention in this sec-
tion are deduced in a similar straightforward manner.
However, due to space limitations, and since we do not
provide the exhaustive set of inference rules, we have
only provided (above) the proof for formula (v).
2. Investigating & Realising a shared intention. After
both agents agree that they share the desire of buying the
gift together, they go on to argue on the details of the plan
they will follow. For example, where will they buy the
gift from? What should they buy Mary? And so on. In
this paper, we do not dwell on the details of argumenta-
tion. However, assuming both agents agree on a plan p,
and they both communicate their agreement to each other,
then Carla’s belief base is updated to contain the follow-
ing:
I(c, SE({c, b}, g, p), pc)
B(c, I(b, SE({c, b}, g, p), pb))
B(c, pc ⊂ p ∧ pc = ∅ ∧ pb ⊂ p ∧ pb = ∅)
And the following is then deduced:
B(c, SI({c, b}, SE({c, b}, g, p), p))
Note that pc is Carla’s part of the plan and pb is Bill’s part
of the plan.
Similarly, Bill’s belief base is updated by adding:
I(b, SE({c, b}, g, p), pb)
B(b, I(c, SE({c, b}, g, p), pc))
B(b, pc ⊂ p ∧ pc = ∅ ∧ pb ⊂ p ∧ pb = ∅)
And the following is deduced:
B(b, SI({c, b}, SE({c, b}, g, p), p))
As such, the following now holds:
SI({c, b}, SE({c, b}, g, p), p)
Note that each agent commits to performing its own part
of the plan (in this case, pc and pb, respectively) to make
sure the plan is realised, and both agents believe that this
plan will realise their shared experience.
3. Realising a shared experience. After executing their ac-
tions and the plan is fulﬁlled, if the agents can perceive
that the plan has been fulﬁlled, then Carla’s belief base is
updated to contain the following:
B(c, SE({c, b}, g, p))
Similarly, Bill’s belief base is updated by adding:
B(b, SE({c, b}, g, p))
And the shared experience is said to have been realised:
SE({c, b}, g, p)
Background
In our literature review, we do not focus on BDI approaches
in multiagent system (such as the work of Bordini, Hu¨bner,
and Wooldridge (2007); Winikoff (2005); Rao and Georgeff
(1991); Casali, Godo, and Sierra (2011); Rao (1996); Das-
tani (2008); Parsosn and Giorgini (1999)) because to our
knowledge, there is no mention of the notion of experience
and shared intentionality in current BDI approaches, which
is the main contribution of our work. Individual actions are
dictated by individual intentions, which are the result of in-
dividual beliefs, and desires. But how do collective actions
come about? In this section, we relate our work to exist-
ing philosophical views that have discussed these issues (as
summarised by Tollefsen (2004)). Philosophers, especially
those interested in action theory, have been more and more
interested in the notion of collective actions, intentionality,
and belief.
Some argue that the collective attitude simply refers to
the fact that the majority of the group’s members share that
attitude (Quinton, 1975). These accounts were labelled as
summative accounts by Gilbert (1987, 1989). For instance,
simple summative accounts (SSA) state that: Group G in-
tends p if and only if all or most of the members intend p.
However, it has been argued that the SSA is not sufﬁcient
(e.g. Gilbert (1987, 1989)). The complex summative ac-
counts (CSA) try to address this problem by introducing the
notion of common knowledge. The CSA states that: Group
G intends p if and only if: (1) most of the members of G
intend p, and (2) it is common knowledge in G that (1).
In our model, simple summative accounts are described
by the common modalities. For example, a common ex-
perience is nothing more than an experience that has been
experienced by the individuals of the group. Similarly, a
common belief is a belief that happens to be shared by the
group’s members. Common desires and intentions are de-
ﬁned similarly. Complex summative accounts are described
by the joint modalities. For example, a joint experience is
an experience that is common to a group, and the members
of the group are aware that they have all experienced the
same experience. Similarly, a joint belief is a belief that is
common to the members of the group, and the members are
aware that they share the same belief. Again, joint desires
and intentions are deﬁned similarly.
Gilbert argues that both the SSA and CSA accounts are
not the right approaches since a group’s attitude cannot al-
ways be described in terms of the individual ones, even if
it was enhanced with common knowledge (Gilbert, 1989,
1994). For instance, a group of people who are jogging in
the morning in the park are aware of each other’s intentions
to jog; yet, there is something different between this group
of people and a group of friends who decide to jog together.
While our model does deﬁne common and joint modali-
ties, we note that these collective modalities are simply used
to describe the collection of individual modalities. They are
not used to describe the groups’ intentions as a whole. For
that, the shared modality is introduced. A shared experi-
ence is a joint experience in which the agents are actively
involved. A shared intention is an intention shared by the
group members to carry out a predeﬁned plan for fulﬁlling a
joint desire. However, before we dwell on the shared modal-
ities, we ﬁrst introduce the philosophers’ different views,
and then compare them to our proposed model.
Searle (1990, 1995) states that the we-intend cannot be re-
duced to a set of I-intend, even if it was supplemented with
mutual beliefs. For example, having two strangers walking
down the street that happen to walk next to each other is dif-
ferent than having a couple walking together down the street.
As such, Searle argues that collective intentions should com-
bine the sense of acting with the sense of willing something
together. In our model, the notion of shared experience does
not necessarily imply that the different agents sharing an ex-
perience were willing to perform the actions they did to-
gether. For example, a couple of strangers who intend to
jog in the morning may share this experience if they hap-
pen to be at the same place at the same time. However, the
shared intention is deﬁned as having a shared plan, where
each agent intends to fulﬁl its part of the plan. The very def-
inition of an agent’s intention is its willingness and commit-
ment to execute the corresponding plan. As such, a shared
intention is realised only if the agents are willing and com-
mitting to execute their actions as detailed by the plan agreed
upon. An example of this would be a couple who agree to
go jogging together in the morning.
Searle has been strongly criticised for his “brain in a vat
condition”, which states that intentionality could be held by
a brain in a vat. We do not study how beliefs are formed and
whether an agent can form a belief about something it has
never encountered, or if two agents can share a belief if there
is no alignment between their ontologies. This is outside the
scope of our work. However, we do note that although a
joint intention can either be true or false, an agent may still
hold false beliefs about a joint intention. This happens if it
holds false beliefs about other agents’ beliefs and intentions.
Bratman (1992, 1999), like Searle, does not believe in a
plural agent that could hold shared intentions, nor does he
believe that shared intentions can be reduced to individual
intentional states. In his discussion, Bratman uses the word
“shared intention” as opposed to “collective intention” to re-
fer to interrelated individual intentional states. In his deﬁ-
nition, an intention is shared if and only if our intentional
actions are coordinated by making sure our personal plans
of action meld together. As such, shared intentions give rise
to argumentation and negotiation for agreeing on the coordi-
nated plans of actions. Bratman further argues, like Searle,
that a single agent can have a we-intention (Bratman, 1997,
1999), which has attracted a great deal of criticism (Stout-
land, 1997; Velleman, 1997), since one cannot intend what
he/she cannot fulﬁl (in other words, one cannot intend ac-
tions that may only be executed by others).
Similar to Bratman, we say an intention is shared only if
there is a shared plan of action that meshes and coordinates
individual actions. The level of coordination, however, re-
mains loose. For example, the plan may simply state who
does what, without going into the order or the pre and post
conditions of actions. However, unlike Bratman and Searle,
we say a shared intention cannot be held by a single agent
(although single agents may form beliefs about the truth of
shared intentions), but by the group of agents who the plan
of action cannot be carried out without. Agents can only
intend to perform their part of a shared plan.
Finally, we note that Bratman refused to accept the notion
of obligations and promises in shared intentions, arguing
that promises are neither sufﬁcient nor necessary for shared
intentions. Gilbert (1989, 1996) argued otherwise, and as
such, believed that both Searle and Bratman have failed to
consider the normative element of shared intentions, or the
resulting commitments of a shared plan. For instance, if one
of the couple who decided to jog together in the morning
decides to leave in the middle of the walk, this will be con-
sidered as a violation of a commitment, and the other has the
right to take offense. In our model, individual intentions are
deﬁned as the agent’s commitment to execute the predeﬁned
plan for achieving a given goal. As such, a shared inten-
tion becomes the commitment of each member to the shared
plan for achieving a given goal. However, there are no social
norms attached to shared intentions that specify how breach-
ing a certain commitment is dealt with, or how agents lying
about their intentions are punished. This does not contradict
the proposed model, but lies outside its scope.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have provided a novel and formal agent
model by introducing the notion of experience, which situ-
ates agents in their environment, providing a clear and tan-
gible link on how the environment (and its changes) impact
the evolution of an agent’s BDI. Experiences help complete
the BDI cycle: experiences shape beliefs (usually resulting
in belief updates), beliefs inﬂuence desires, and desires drive
intentions. Intentions in turn lead the agent to act in its envi-
ronment (where the action could be as simple as to observe),
which results in the agent having new experiences.
We have also built a logical formalism, the X-BDI, to de-
scribe agent reasoning whose semantics are based on our
proposed agent model. Another novel contribution of this
work is deﬁning, through the X-BDI logic, the notion of
shared experience and using it as a fundamental construct
to underpin collective intentionality. Our work essentially
motivates shared experiences and intentionality: the basis of
social behaviour and the foundation of multiagent systems
in general.
Our ongoing work provides a blueprint for an experience-
based BDI agent architecture, speciﬁed in the Z nota-
tion (Spivey, 1989). This means that the semantics of the
logic can much more readily be used for the implementa-
tion of agent systems and so we address arguably the most
signiﬁcant issue with new logics of agency that there is no
clear link between the theory they describe and the practice
of building real systems.
Our future plans are to formally prove the soundness and
completeness of the inference system and to develop a P2P
agent system developed form the Z speciﬁcation of our agent
architecture along with the X-BDI reasoning system. We
are using the theory outlined here to build social browsers
that enable human users, supported by software agents, to
share online cultural experiences such as jointly visiting the
website of a museum form their homes.
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